Continuing their war against free choice, Democrats are ramping up their crusade to save people from themselves, this time by bringing tobacco under the control of the FDA.
The House voted 326-102 Wednesday to approve legislation granting FDA authority over tobacco products, paving the way for the Senate to possibly consider the bill in the fall.
Lawmakers have tried for more than a decade to place tobacco products under FDA purview in an effort to stem smoking.
The bill has wide bipartisan support, but Republican leaders and the Bush administration oppose it. They assert FDA would not have the resources to take on a new responsibility and argue agency oversight would give the public the wrong impression that tobacco is safe.
The administration threatened to veto the bill Wednesday, arguing the bill would disproportionately tax low-income Americans. The measure would assess user fees from tobacco companies to raise an estimated $5 billion over 10 years to underwrite FDA’s efforts.
The debate turned heated when House Minority Leader Boehner, perhaps the House’s highest profile smoker, took the floor.
“Most of my colleagues know that I smoke,” he said. “I know that smoking is probably not good for my health. Most Americans know cigarettes are probably not good for their health. Do we need the government to tell us? Do we need to spend $5 billion of smokers’ money for the government to tell us?”
Summoning the self-righteous hot air of all the liberal crusaders in this nation’s history, Dingus responded by patting himself on the back for his noble purpose.
“This legislation is on the floor because people are killing themselves by smoking these evil cigarettes,” Dingell said.
“The distinguished gentleman, the minority leader, is going to be amongst the next to die,” said Dingell. Then with a wide smile, he added, “I am trying to save him, as the rest of us are, because he is committing suicide every time he puffs on one of those things.”
What exactly makes Dingus more qualified to evaluate the risk versus reward of Boehner’s smoking than Boehner himself?
Some might be wondering why Phillip Morris broke from the rest of the industry and supported this legislation. The easy answer might be that they saw the writing on the wall and sought to mitigate the extent of the damage. I believe the answer is something else.
These kinds of regulatory interventions in the name of consumer protection are nothing new. What apparently only Phillip Morris realized, however, is that after do-gooders get what they want, they lose interest. The regulatory bodies they created are then free to be co-opted by industry, where they are then used to prevent competition.
When the uproar began against the railroad industry, far thinking railroaders realized they could use the federal intervention to their advantage. After the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission they were able to do just that. Because no one understood the railroad industry more than railroaders, the more regulatory power was granted to the ICC over railroads the more their own bureaucrats were drawn from the industry itself. By the time trucking became a major threat to the railroad industry, ICC was perfectly placed to defend the railroads from competition. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 gave the ICC authority to regulate truckers (to protect the railroads), which they used to severely limit the ability of new truckers to enter the industry.
The story of the ICC is hardly unique. Indeed, it represents the natural history of government intervention, as described by Milton Friedman:
A real of fancied evil leads to demands to do something about it. A political coalition forms consisting of sincere, high-minded reformers and equally sincere interested parties. The incompatible objectives of the members of the coalition (e.g., low prices to consumers and high prices to producers) are glossed over by fine rhetoric about “the public interest,” “fair competition,” and the like. The coalition succeeds in getting Congress (or a state legislature) to pass a law. The preamble to the law pays lip service to th rhetoric and the body of the law grants power to government officials to “do something.” The high-minded reformers experience a glow of triumph and turn their attention to new causes. The interested parties go to work to make sure that the power is used for their benefit. They generally succeed.
The history of the FDA itself meets this pattern. Reformers were concerned about the conditions at meat-packing plants. Special interests quickly hoped on board. Meat-packers were more than happy to have government certify the cleanliness of their product, and have taxpayers pay for the process.
Today’s FDA does far more harm than good. It prevents the creation and distribution of valuable new drugs, benefiting manufacturers who face limited competition once they’ve established themselves. Phillip Morris is apparently more forward-thinking than other tobacco companies and has learned from this history. They realize government can grant them far more power than the market ever would allow, and they know that high-minded reformers are the vehicle through which they can successfully grab this power.
